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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
In this criminal case, the Court of Appeals has authority to 
decide the appeal based upon Utah Code Annotated, 78-2(a)-2(e), 
which grants to the Court of Appeal appellate jurisdiction in final 
orders involving criminal cases Rule 3 and 4 of the Rules of the 
Appellate Procedure. 
STATEMENT OF NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
On the 3rd day of January, 1990, and later on May 10, 1990, 
Judge Douglas Cornaby, Second District Court, entered an order 
denying the motion to set aside the prior judgment. This is an 
Appeal in a criminal case after a plea of guilty to charge of a 
Third Degree Felony Aggravated Assault Utah Code Annotated (76-5-
103) . After the plea was entered and after sentencing, the 
Defendant made a motion to withdraw the guilty plea, an evidentiary 
hearing was held on September 12, 1989, at which time the Court 
denied the motion. After the first appeal in this matter was 
dismissed due to a lack of a signed order, the Court signed an 
Order on May 10, 1990, denying the Motion to set aside the plea. 
This appeal concerning the denial of that motion was timely filed. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
1. Did the court err in accepting aside the guilty plea 
of the Defendant in light of the evidence that the offense was a 
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Simple Assault and the fact that he was not represented by an 
effective legal counsel at the time of plea. 
2. In light of claim of the Defendant as to the lack of 
serious bodily injury, a firearm, and lack of intent to cause 
serious injury, did the defendant-respondent show good cause to 
withdraw his plea. 
3. Did the Court err in applying the wrong standard 
concerning the motion to withdraw the plea. 
4. The standard of review is specifically set forth in Point 
II of the brief. 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES 
Utah Code Annotated 
76-5-102. Assault 
(1) Assault is: 
(a) an attempt with unlawful force or violence, to do 
bodily injury to another; 
(b) a threat, accompanied by a show of immediate force 
or violence, to do bodily injury to another; or 
(c) an act, committed with unlawful force or violence, 
that causes bodily injury to another. 
(2) Assault is a class B misdemeanor. 
Utah Code Annotated 
76-5-103. Aggravated assault. 
(1) A person commits aggravated assault if he commits assault 
as defined in Section 76-5-102 and he: 
(a) intentionally causes serious bodily injury to 
another; or 
(b) uses a dangerous weapon as defined in Section 76-1-
601 or other means or force likely to produce death 
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or serious injury• 
(2) Aggravated assault is a third degree felony. 
Rule 11 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure: 
Subsection 5: (prior to 1989 Amendment): 
77-35-11. Rule 11 - Pleas. (a) Upon arraignment, except in 
case of an infraction a defendant shall be 
represented by counsel, unless the defendant waives 
counsel in open court, and shall not be required to 
plead until he has had a reasonable time to confer 
with counsel. 
(b) A defendant may plead not guilty, guilty or no 
contest. If a defendant refuses to pleas or if a 
defendant corporation fails to appear, the court 
shall enter a plea of not guilty. 
(c) A defendant may plead no contest only with the 
consent of the court. 
(d) When a defendant enters a plea of not guilty, 
the case shall forthwith be set for trail. 
Defendants unable to make bail shall be given a 
preference for an early trial. In non-felony cases 
the court shall advise the defendant, or his 
counsel, of the requirements for making a written 
demand *for a jury trial. 
(e) The court may refuse to accept a plea of guilty 
or no contest and shall not accept such a plea until 
the court has made the findings: 
(1) That if the defendant is not represented by 
counsel he has knowingly waived his right to counsel 
and does not desire counsel; 
(2) That the plea is voluntarily made; 
(3) That the defendant knows he had rights against 
compulsory self-incrimination, to a jury trial and 
to confront and cross-examine in open court the 
witnesses against him, and that by entering the plea 
he waives all of those rights; 
(4) That the defendant understands the nature and 
elements of the offense to which he is entering the 
plea; that upon trial the prosecution would have 
the burden of proving each of those elements beyond 
a reasonable doubt; and that the plea is an 
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admission of all those elements; 
(5) That the defendant knows the minimum and 
maximum sentence that may be imposed upon him for 
each offense to which a plea is entered, including 
the possibility of the imposition of consecutive 
sentences; and 
(6) Whether the tendered plea is a result of prior 
plea discussion and plea agreement and if so, what 
agreement has been reached. 
If it appears that the prosecuting attorney or any other 
party has agreed to request or recommend the acceptance 
of a plea to a lesser included offense, or the dismissal 
of other charges, the same shall be approved by the 
court. If recommendations as to sentence are allowed by 
the court, the court shall advise the defendant 
personally that any recommendation as to sentence is not 
binding on the court. 
(f) The judge shall not participate in plea discussions 
prior to any agreement being made by the prosecuting 
attorney, but once a tentative plea agreement has 
been reached which contemplates entry of a plea in 
the expectation that other charges will be dropped 
or dismissed, the judge, upon request of the 
parties, may permit the disclosure to him of such 
tentative agreement and the reasons therefor in 
advance of the time for tender of the plea. The 
judge may then indicate to the prosecuting attorney 
and defense counsel whether he will approve the 
proposed disposition. Thereafter, if the judge 
decides that final disposition should not be handled 
in conformity with the plea agreement, he shall so 
advise the defendant and then call upon the 
defendant to either affirm or withdraw his plea. 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal in a criminal case from a sentence entered 
after a guilty plea. A motion to set aside was filed after thirty 
days from the date of the sentence. A hearing was held on the 
motion to set aside and denied. The Court did not enter a written 
findings until May 6, 1990, at which time the Defendant filed an 
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appeal within thirty days. 
COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS 
The appeal was filed from the final order after the first 
timely appeal was dismissed due to a lack of a final order. 
DISPOSITION AT TRIAL COURT 
The Defendant was sentenced to prison for 0 to 5 years for 
aggravated assault after a guilty plea. 
RELEVANT FACTS 
WITH THE CITATIONS TO THE RECORD 
1. After waving his preliminary hearing and pleading not 
guilty on the initial arraignment the Defendant was present in 
Court on August 30, 1988, for a Pre-trial hearing. (See Transcript 
of August 30, 1988). 
2. At the hearing, the Defendant's Counsel indicated the 
Defendant would plead guilty as charged to aggravated assault as 
the result of a plea agreement. The only concern under the plea 
agreement was that the Prosecutor was to recommend that he would 
not spend anymore than thirty (30) days in jail (P. 7 of Transcript 
of August 30, 1988). 
3. After discussing with the Defendant the rights he was 
waiving, the following exchange took place between the Court, the 
Defendant, and Caravel Harward, the prosecutor: 
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MR. HARWARD: Here's what were claiming, the victim 
in the case is Ms. McKinnon who is a girlfriend of Mr. 
Martinez. He hit her with his hands an feet. He caused 
injury to her including a broken nose and damage to her. 
She was taken to the Saint Benedict's Hospital in Weber 
County where she was treated. 
THE COURT: All right. First, an assault— an assault 
is an unlawful use of force on a person of another, and you 
understand you have no right to exercise any force over 
another person, don't you? 
MR. MARTINEZ: Yes, I do. 
THE COURT: And that what you did on this occasion you did 
wilfully, you wilfully assaulted her. 
MR. MARTINEZ: No, I didn't, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Well, Counsel — 
MR. ODA: He's saying wilfully. Do you understand what 
willfully means? Willfully as opposed to an accident. 
MR. MARTINEZ: Yes. 
THE COURT: An illustration is your drive down the road 
and somebody runs out between two cars and you wind up 
hitting them. That's an accident. You understand this 
is wilfully done. This is not an accident. Do you 
understand what you're saying? 
MR. MARTINEZ: Yes. I understand. 
THE COURT: It was wilfully done; is that correct? 
MR. MARTINEZ: Yes, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: You did it intentionally? 
MR. MARTINEZ: No 
THE COURT: Well, did you intend to hit her? 
MR MARTINEZ: No, I didn't. 
THE COURT: How did you hit her in the nose and break her 
nose without intending to do it? 
MR. ODA: I think the problem here, he didn't— we've 
talked about this, Your Honor. He didn't intended to 
damage her, but he- I think there's no doubt he intended 
to -
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THE COURT: Well, the question is when he smacked her in 
the nose, did he intend his fist to come in contact with 
her nose? That's the intent. 
THE COURT: You didn't intend to hit her in the nose? 
When your feet came in contact with her, you didn't 
intend for your feet to come in contact with her? 
MR, MARTINEZ: (Nods head from side to side.) 
MR ODA: Do you want to talk about this? 
MR. MARTINEZ: Yes, I understand what he's saying. 
THE COURT: You cannot accidentally commit an aggravated 
assault. Do you understand that? 
MR. MARTINEZ: Yes. 
THE COURT: There's no such thing as an accidental 
aggravated assault. It must be wilfully and 
intentionally done, and the Court can't take a plea 
unless it's being plead to wilfully and intentionally 
doing it. 
MR. MARTINEZ: I didn't intend to hurt her, Your Honor. 
MR. ODA: Did you intend to hit her? That's the 
question. Okay. It's very simple, Henry. 
MR. MARTINEZ: Yes. In intended to hit her, but not 
intentionally hurt her, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Did you intentionally kick her? 
MR. MARTINEZ: No, I didn't. She struck me first and I 
didn't realize that I was a lot stronger than her and I 
hurt her, and I'm very sorry for what I've done, but -
THE COURT: How big is she? 
MR. MARTINEZ: She comes to about right here on me. 
(Indicating). 
THE COURT: How much does she weigh? 
MR. MARTINEZ: About — I don't know. I have no ideas. 
She's about — 
THE COURT: More of less than you? 
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MR. ODA: I think she weighs about 115, 20 pounds. She's 
an average-sized girl. 
THE COURT: And how much do you weigh? 
MR.. MARTINEZ: I weigh 130. 
THE COURT: Are you in good physical condition? 
MR. MARTINEZ: No I'm not. 
THE COURT: You look like it. What's the matter with 
you? 
MR. MARTINEZ: I'm underweight. I don't — 
THE COURT: Is there anything the matter with you besides 
you're underweight? 
MR. MARTINEZ: No. No. 
THE COURT: What do you think you should weigh? 
MR. MARTINEZ: I should weigh 148 for my size. 
THE COURT: And you weigh a hundred and what? 
MR. MARTINEZ: I weigh 11. I weighed 115 then when it 
happened. I was under a lot of stress and I was— I 
wasn't eating. When I went to jail, I came out 130. 
MR. ODA: Do you want me to talk to the defendant Your 
Honor? 
THE COURT: I think you better. I think you better 
because aggravated assault — let me read it. 
"That cit the time and place aforesaid, the defendant did 
assault another person and intentionally caused serious 
bodily injury or did use such means or force likely to 
produce serious bodily injury." 
Without him pleading to those elements, we've got 
to go to trial. 
MR. ODA: Okay. 
THE COURT: Go in the other room and talk to counsel. 
Now, on our next matter, counsel is not here yet. It's set 
for 11:00. So we'll be in recess until 11:00. 
MR. MAJOR: Thank you, your Honor. 
(WHEREUPON, at the time there was a recess after which 
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proceedings resumed as follows:) 
THE COURT: The records can show we're back on the State 
of Utah vs. Henry A. Martinez. 
MR. HARWARD: Your Honor, I have a motion to make to the 
Court. In drawing up the information, I have plead in 
the alternative. Under the Statute involved a person can 
commit aggravated assault by committing simple assault 
as that is defined and intentionally causing serious 
bodily injury to another or using such means or force 
likely to cause injury. 
So for the purpose of this case, I'm going to make a 
motion that we delete the language in the information 
following the phrase "the defendant did assault another 
person and". Okay, Now, delete "intentionally caused 
serious bodily injury," and the comma, and the 
conjunction or. 
So it will read: That at the time and place aforesaid, 
the defendant did assault another person and did use such 
means or force to produce serious bodily injury. 
It's still a felony of the third degree. It only 
eliminates the one alternative. 
THE COURT: Okay. Is that agreeable to counsel? 
MR. ODA: Yes, Your Honor. I think we all understand the 
problem now. 
THE COURT: Now, I'm not going to repeat anything I said 
before. You understand that? 
MR. MARTINEZ: Yes, sir. 
THE COURT: We're taking about the elements of the 
offense. We have talked about what an assault is, and 
he's agreed that he committed an assault. He's agreed 
he committed it. So we're down to willful and intentional 
part of the committing of the assault, and the remainder 
left in here" did use such means or force likely to 
produce serious boldly injury." 
Do you want to ask your client about that? 
MR. ODA: You understand what — we had a discussion out 
of the — off the record — 
MR. MARTINEZ: Yes. 
MR. ODA: — and you understand that now the COurt is 
asking you did you do something, that is, strike Teresa 
or kick her or do anything that was likely to cause her 
seriously bodily injury. Do you understand that? 
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MR. MARTINEZ: Yes, I do. 
MR. ODA: As opposed to an accident. Okay. Now, did you 
do something that was likely to cause serious bodily 
injury to Teresa McKinnon? 
MR. MARTINEZ: Yes, Your Honor. I apologize. I'm sorry 
for not understanding. 
THE COURT: No problem, you don't have to apologize for 
that. 
MR ODA: You understand that what you did was not an 
accident, right? 
MR. MARTINEZ: Yes. 
MR. ODA: Okay. I think he understands better. the 
problem was that he thought the Court was asking him if 
he intentionally intended to break her nose. He was 
having a little difficulty with that. 
THE COURT: I think that we covered all the elements. 
Did we leave any out, counsel, that you know of? 
MR. HARWARD: No, I think we've covered all of the 
elements. 
THE COURT: All right. Having asked you all of these 
question, have you changed your minds about wanting to 
enter into the negotiated plea? 
MR. MARTINEZ: No, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Did you say no? 
MR. MARTINEZ: No, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Okay. All right. the Court will find you 
appear to be making a voluntary, knowing and understating 
pleas. As to the charge of aggravated assault, a felony 
of the third degree, do you want it entered as a pleas 
of guilty or not guilty? 
MR. MARTINEZ: Guilty, Your Honor. 
(Page 9 line 2 to Page 16 line 3) 
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4. The matter came back before the Judge for sentencing on 
September 27, 1988, at that time the Court sentenced the Defendant 
to undergo a ninety-day diagnostic evaluation until December 20, 
1988. At that time on exchange took place between the Defendant's 
attorney and the Court concerning the presentence report. The 
Defendant's counsel indicated that the Defendant during the ninety 
day evaluation process did not recognize that he did something 
wrong. The Defendant's Counsel made no attempt to correct or amend 
the report. On December 20, 1988, the Defendant appeared for 
sentencing and his sentencing was continued because of problems 
concerning the presentence report. Defendant's Counsel stated that 
he needed additional time to obtained more information. 
5. On January 3, 1989, the Defendant appeared at Court and 
the Court stated: 
I noted that we continued this a couple weeks 
because you wanted to get more information for the 
Court Did you get that? 
MR. ODA: Yes, Your Honor, Well, the order was to 
obtain another information for the Department of 
Corrections as to Mr. Martinez's attitude and 
history, but we're unable to get that done, so we're 
prepared to get sentence at this particular time. 
(Page 3 line 13 to Page 3 line 20) 
6. The Court then sentenced the Defendant to immediately 
zero to 5 years in the State Prison. After being committed to 
Prison, the Defendant filed a Motion to Set Aside. 
7. On Tuesday, September 12, 1989, a hearing was held on the 
Defendants Motions to set aside the plea of guilty filed after 
sentencing. Mr. Martinez took the stand and testified as follows: 
Q And did you have occasion to talk to Mr. Oda 
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prior to Judge Cornaby asking you some questions about 
your guilty plea? 
A Umm, I was called in to the Counsel room for 
about five minutes before I went on the stand. 
Q. Did he give you some advice in relation 
as to what to say when Judge Cornaby asked you 
the questions? 
A. Yes, he did. He told me to shut my mouth 
so I wouldn't piss off the judge anymore of 
piss him off at that present time. 
(Page 6 of September 12, 1989 hearing.) 
Concerning the voluntarily of his plea, Mr. Martinez stated: 
Q. Did you willingly and voluntarily enter 
a guilty plea? 
A. No, I can't say that. I feel I was coerced 
into it. 
Q. Were there any promises made to you by anybody 
concerning your guilty by either Mr. Oda— 
A. Yes 
Q. What was that? 
A. Leniency of conviction, that I was — well 
lemiency of the outcome. That's what I mean 
to say. 
Q. Did that influence you to say not guilty? 
A. Yes, it did. 
(Page 7 line 10 to Page line 24) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
DETAILS OF THE ARGUMENT 
I 
ISSUES 
NO FACTUAL BASIS EXISTS TO SUPPORT THE TRIAL 
COURT'S DENIAL OF THE MOTION TO SET ASIDE THE 
PLEA IN LIGHT OF THE INADEQUATE EXAMINATION OF 
THE DEFENDANT AT THE TIME THE PLEA WAS ENTERED 
AND THE FAILURE TO ENTER SUFFICIENT FINDINGS 
AFTER THE EVIDENTIARY HEARING ON THE MOTION TO 
SET ASIDE THE PLEA. 
In Jolivet v. Cook, 784 P.2d 1148 (Utah 1989), the 
Supreme Court described the applicable legal standards to be 
applied in cases involving motions to withdraw a guilty plea. The 
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Court stated: 
Section 77-35-l(e)(4) of the Code requires 
that before a trial court accepts a guilty 
plea, it must find that the defendant 
understands the nature and elements of the 
offense to which he or she is entering the 
pleas. In Gibbons, this Court stated that in 
making this finding, the trial court must 
ensure that the defendant understands "the 
elements of the crimes charged and the 
relationship of the law to the facts." Id. at 
1312. In addition, section 77-35-ll(e)(5) 
requires that before the trial court accepts 
a guilty plea, it must find that the defendant 
knows of the possibility of the imposition of 
consecutive sentences. The record clearly 
shows that at the time the guilty pleas were 
accepted, Judge Burns did not make the 
findings required by the Code, i.e., that 
Jolivet understood the elements of each crime 
charged and how those elements related to the 
facts and that Jolivet knew the possibility of 
the imposition of consecutive sentences. 
However, this Court has held, "[T]he absence 
of a finding under [section 77-335-11] is not 
critical so long as the record as a whole 
affirmatively establishes that the defendant 
entered his plea with full knowledge and 
understanding of its consequences and of the 
rights he was waiving." (at 18) 
The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the trial court 
because the lower court had made specific findings that the plea 
was knowingly and voluntarily entered and that "[in] particular, 
Judge Burns found that Jolivet understood the elements of the 
crimes charged and how those elements related to the facts..."(at 
18) . 
In Mr. Martinez's case, the trial judge made no such findings, 
either before the plea or after the hearing. At the time of the 
hearing on the motion to set aside, the trial judge had access to 
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a transcript of the plea and should have been aware of the 
Defendant's prior ambiguous answers. (See transcript of 9-12-89, 
page 29, line 12) However, the court did not make any 
particularized findings which correlate the Defendants statements 
at the time of the plea to the specific elements of aggravated 
assault. Furthermore, the court never signed any written findings 
which relate* to the requirements concerning the factual basis for 
the plea and only made a general finding that the plea was 
voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently entered. 
The necessity of findings of fact, including the Defendant's 
understanding of elements of the charges and the relationship of 
the law and facts was set forth in State v. Valencia. 776 P.2d 1332 
(Utah Ct. App. 1989). The State v. Valencia, the court stated: 
The trial court is emburdened to ensure compliance 
with the constitutional and Rule 11(5) requirements when 
a guilty plea is received. Gibbons, 740 P.2d at 1312. 
Although the issue here was first raised on appeal by 
appellcint, in certain cases we may consider the failure 
to comply with Rule 11(5) and Gibbons as error 
sufficiently manifest and fundamental to be first raised 
on appeal to this court. Cf. Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 
238, 241-42, 89 S.Ct. 1709. 1711, 23 L.Ed.2d 274 (1969) 
("It was error, plain on the face of the record, for the 
trial judge to accept petitioner's guilty plea without 
an affirmative showing that it was intelligent and 
voluntary.") . 
We consider the trial court's examination of defendant 
at the time of the plea to be wholly inadequate under 
Rule 11(5). See Gibbons, 740 P.2d at 1312-13. Strict, 
and not just substantial, compliance with the rule is 
required. State v.. Vasilacopulos, 756 P. 2d 92, 94 (Utah 
App.1988). 
The defendant demonstrated consistently that the original plea 
was not knowingly or intelligently entered. The trial judge in 
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this case relied on the affidavit signed at the time of the entry 
of the plea and the defendant's confused responses. In State v. 
Gibbons. 740 P.2d 1309 (Utah 1988): 
The use of a sufficient affidavit can promote 
efficiency, but an affidavit should be only the 
starting point, not an end point, in the pleading 
process.... The trial judge should then review the 
statements in the affidavit with the defendant, 
question the defendant concerning his understanding 
of it, and fulfill the other requirements imposed 
by Section 77-35-11 on the record before accepting 
the guilty plea. 
There is no sufficient examination, on the record, to provide 
a factual basis to conclude the Defendant knew the elements of the 
felony offense. See State v. Vasilacopolous, 756 P.2d 94 (Utah 
1989). The defendant merely indicated that he did not 
"negligently" injure the alleged victim and always protested any 
intent to cause serious injury. 
Finally, the court did not enter any findings of conduct any 
inquiry concerning the issue of ineffective assistance of counsel 
raised by the Defendant at the post-plea hearing. The Utah cases 
require an adequate record in order to determine whether the 
Defendant received effective assistance of counsel and entered a 
plea with full rights to counsel. Jensen v. Deland. 125 Utah Adv. 
Rep. 19 (1990), Bundv v. Deland, 763 P.2d 803 (Utah 1988) and 
Strickland v. Washington. 466 U.S. 668 (1984). 
The defendant testified that he was not effectively assisted 
by counsel at the post-trial hearing (See transcript sept. 12, 
1989, page 8 to 11). The court took a recess to allow the 
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Defendant to consult with his attorney at the time of the original 
plea; however, the unrebutted testimony at the post-trial hearing 
proves he was not effectively represented . In any event, the 
prosecutor had to on the spot amend the Information to provide that 
"the defendant did assault another person and did use such means 
or force likely to produce serious bodily injury." (Page 13, line 
25) . 
The Defendant submits that the record is devoid after the 
amendment of any discussion concerning the actual elements of 
aggravated assault, especially the element of intent. The only 
discussion is concerning the difference between simple negligence 
or accident and there is no examination as to the intent required 
by the offense. See State in the Interest of Besendorfer, 568 P.d 
742 (1973), State v. McElhanev, 579 P.2d 328 (Utah 1978), and State 
v. Elliott, 641 P.2d 122 (Utah 1982). 
II. 
THE STANDARD OF REVIEW UNDER RULE 11 OF THE 
UTAH RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE IS TO 
DETERMINE IF THERE HAS BEEN STRICT COMPLIANCE 
WITH THE RULE. 
In State v. Valencia, 776 P.2d 1331 (Utah App. 1989) the Court 
of Appeals stated that "strict and not just substantial compliance 
is required under Rule 11." The court held that the facts to 
determine whether the Defendant understood the elements of the 
charges and the relationship of the law and facts may not be 
presumed from a silent or incomplete examination. The court stated 
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that the failure to make adequate findings constitutes reversible 
error. See also. State v. Gentry, 141 Utah Adv. Rep 56 (Ct. App. 
1990.(Sufficient examination must be on the record or reversal) 
III. 
THE OBJECTIVE, UNREBUTTED RECORD DEMONSTRATES 
INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL 
The defendant-appellant submits that the record demonstrates 
that he was not represented by effective defense counsel at the 
time the plea was entered, a critical stage of the proceedings. 
The prosecution never called at the post-trial hearing any 
witnesses and tried to impeach the defendant by the plea statement 
form. The defendants testimony that he was coerced and not 
represented by effective counsel when the plea was entered stands 
unrebutted. 
This testimony is corroborated by the record which shows a 
defendant that is confused about the offense prior to the recess. 
At that time the appellant has testified that he was pressured 
into entering the plea.(see page 12 of this brief an Page 6 to 11 
of 9-12-90 transcript) 
Both the defendant's confusion over the elements and the 
alleged lack of effective counsel is evidenced by the December 20, 
1988, hearing, (see page 11 of this brief and transcript of 1-3-
1988) At that time, the defense counsel reports that the defendant 
has an "attitude" problem because of failure to accept 
responsibility for the alleged offense. Defense counsel also 
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requests more time to obtain additional information. At the 
January 3, 1989, hearing counsel admits that the information was 
not obtained. 
CONCLUSION AND REQUEST FOR RELIEF 
The Defendant-Appellant submits that the initial examination 
of the Defendant did not comply with Rule 11 of the Utah Rules of 
Criminal Procedure. Thereafter, the Defendant-Appellant filed a 
timely motion to set aside and introduced uncontroverted evidence 
that the plea was not voluntary or knowing and that he was not 
effectively represented at the time of the plea. 
Therefore, the court should reverse the order denying the 
motion to set aside and enter an order directing the lower court 
to set aside the plea of guilty and to proceed to a new trial on 
the original charges. 
Respectfully submitted this day of September, 1990. 
RANDALL GAITHER 
Attorney for Defendant-Appellant 
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APPENDUM 
The applicable statutes and relevant portions of the record 
have been reproduced in the brief. 
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